Reshaping the psychoanalytic domain: the work of Melanie Klein, W. R. D. Fairbairn, and D. W. Winnicott by Paskauskas, R. Andrew
Book Reviews
But the most interesting aspect ofSapp's bookis hisanalysis ofthe social relations in science
summarized in thechapterentitled 'Patterns ofpower'. Hearguesthatthe successesandfailures
of the various areas of research within heredity were not determined by an "intrinsic logical
necessity ofscientific thought". And that while the "technical advantage one research program
may have over its rivals inproducingresults ... maybeenough totip the scalesin its favor" (my
emphasis), success (or failure) was the outcome of a "struggle for scientific authority" that
involved three factors. One is "material reality" by which I take it he means the "facts" that are
discovered; the second is a competitive struggle between individuals and disciplines; and the
third is the relationship between the scientific enterprise and the nature ofthe society in which
that enterprise is going on. Sapp suggests that these social interactions were the major factors
that determined success, rather than the "strength of the 'true' idea". Thus Morgan's
chromosome-based analysis ofgenetics assumed a dominant role in the study ofheredity, not
only because it was producing results, but because Morgan and his followers controlled the
journals, grant awards, andjob patronage. The nuclearmonopoly ofinheritance resulted from
the ability ofthe Mendelian geneticists to form their own discipline, to set their own objectives,
and todetermine whatscientificknowledge came to becertified andaccepted as true. In sodoing
they certified themselves asexperts in such away as to legitimizeparticular kinds ofstudies. The
result, Sapp says, is that cytoplasmic inheritance was excluded as alegitimate field ofstudy and
its proponents were unjustly kept from the rewards given to those who indulge in successful
scientific research.
I believe that Sapp is putting the cart before the horse. He suggests that aparticular research
field becomes successful because ofthe success ofits proponents in establishing themselves in a
position ofpower. What Sapp does not deal with directly is the question ofwhy the proponents
are able to do this. Why was it the Mendelians and not those investigators of cytoplasmic
inheritance that were successful? The reason, it seems to me, is precisely because the latter's
research programme was not successful. Sapp notes that thechallenge to Mendelianinheritance
failed in the period 1920 to 1940, not because of the intrinsic strength of a "true" idea, but
because the Mendelian geneticists had aneffectivetechnique; that is theMorganists wereable to
do science while the evidence for cytoplasmic heredity was largely based on "vagueprinciples".
Between 1941 and 1958 the investigators of cytoplasmic inheritance "lacked the scientific
techniques required to make amajorchange" and "only arelatively fewcases ofnon-Mendelian
inheritance were reported".
WhatSappisshowinghere isthat thesocial successofan areaofscientificresearchdepends on
the ability of that research to generate results and stimulate further research. Cytoplasmic
inheritance failed to establish itselfas a major research area not because ofthe ineptitude ofits
leaders in the social struggle(Sonneborn andEphrussi were farfrombeingpoliticallyinept), but
because it failed to provide them with the ammunition that they needed. The Mendelian/
Morganist approach did exciting, interesting science that had tremendous explanatory power.
Those interested in extracytoplasmic inheritance seemed, as Sapp says, to produce only a series
of anomalies.
However, Sapp's analysis ofthe social relations in scientific research is, in general, correct. A
briefinspection ofthe editorial boards ofleadingjournals in molecular biology or ofkeynote
speakers at international conferences shows the extent to which a relatively small group of
scientists can dominate a field. This same coterie of scientists reviews grant applications and
exercises job patronage, and in so doing has the power and authority that Sapp describes. I
recommend strongly that research workers should read at least the introduction and the
concluding chapter ofBeyond thegene. For many ofthem, this view oftheirprofession will be
provocative, disturbing, and unwelcome.
Jan A. Witkowski, Banbury Center, Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory
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This study concerns the major clinical findings and theoretical concepts of Melanie Klein,
W. R. D. Fairbairn, and D. W. Winnicott in relation to Freud's theoretical elaboration of
psychical phenomena. A vague set of pronouncements early on in the book about the inter-
elationships of these investigators are later transformed into a highly lucid and interesting
account of the way in which clinical material in the analytic session reshaped the theoretical
domain of psychoanalysis after Freud's death.
The more exciting elements ofthe book include Hughes's linkage ofthe personal analyses of
Harry Guntrip with Fairbairn, and later with Winnicott (the former analysis is based on
Guntrip's lengthy unpublished record ofover 1,000 analytic sessions). A further dimension to
the inner workings of the psychoanalytic scene in Britain in the post-World War II era is
Hughes'sdiscussionofthecasestudyof'Susan'inMarionMilner'simportantbook Thehandsof
the living God (1969)-this patient lived in the Winnicott household for seven years during
Milner's treatment of her, and Winnicott's posthumously published The piggle provides, as
Hughes puts it, "clinical material bearing on the issues with which Milner's Susan had been
grappling for close to two decades".
Hughes's critical approach is refreshing, although not convincing in most places. For
example, whenshe refers to "thedownright sloppinessthatplaguedtheworkofMelanieKlein",
onefeels thatHugheshas notpreparedthegroundproperly. InthecontextofHughes'sanalysis,
the charge simply does not hold. But more serious problems abound in her discussions ofthe
development of Freud's instinct and structural theories.
HughesfocusesrightlyonthetheoreticalimportanceofFreud'sunfinishedandposthumously
published 'Projectfora scientificpsychology' (1895). But she seems oblivious tothefactthat the
roots of the instinct theory can be found in Freud's 'Project' (endogenous Q[uantity] is not
protected by a shieldagainststimuli), orthat itevolved throughthree specific stages. In thefirst,
the sexual and self-preservative (ego) instincts were given equal weight in shaping human
behaviour and experience; in the second, beginningwith the paper on narcissism (Freud, 1914),
the self-preservative instincts weredefined with reference to libido turningback onto theego; in
thethird, thedeathand lifeinstinctswereposited asfundamental(1920)and Freud returned full
circletoideasthatwereembeddedinthe'Project', especiallywithregard to theseparation oftwo
of the key psychical systems-memory and consciousness.
Hughesiscertainly sensitive to theissue ofthe English rendering of"instinct" fortheGerman
concept Trieb versus the more preferred use of"drive" by the English-speaking purists. But in
general she seems unacquainted with the current issues on the English translation of Freud,
although several important papers of Ormston published in the last decade are in her
bibliography. One significant item in the translation debates concerns Freud's structural
hypothesis. Ornston, forexample, supportsthepositionthat the so-called structural theory may
in fact be James Strachey's invention, not Freud's. As Strachey is given more than adequate
coverage as Freud's principal translator in the early chapters by Hughes, her unqualified
assumption that Freud's structural theory is a fundamental "paradigm" ofthe Freudian system
is a serious oversight.
Her strategy ofanalysing the differences between Freud's theoretical concepts and those of
Klein, Fairbairn, and Winnicott is not entirely successful because she does not prepare the
Freudian ground properly. On the other hand, the increasing interplay between clinical and
theoretical material after the chapters on Freud and Klein sustains attention to the very end.
R. Andrew Paskauskas, McGill University, Montreal
EDWARD M. HUNDERT, Philosophy, psychiatry and neuroscience: three approaches to the
mind. A synthetic analysis ofthe varieties ofhuman experience, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1989,
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More than one commentator hasdefended the obscurity ofHegel'sphilosophical writings on
thegroundsthatthetruths with which he wasconcerned are themselvesinvincibly obscure. Any
book which claims to be an extension ofthe Hegelian programme is therefore unlikely to be an
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